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Abstract:	   Post-­‐Ottoman	   temporal	   topologies—cases	   where	   the	   past,	   present,	   and	   future	  may	   be	  bent	   around	   one	   another	   rather	   than	   ordered	   linearly—may	   produce	   uncanny	   histories.	   The	  uncanny	   is	   activated,	   as	   Freud	   noted,	   when	   something	   secret	   comes	   to	   light,	   but	   also	   when	   the	  expectations	   of	   a	   given	   genre	   are	   exceeded.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   genre	   of	   historicism	   has	   been	  violated.	   Rather	   than	   contending	   that	   the	   post-­‐Ottoman	  world	   is	   entirely	   different	   from	  Western	  Europe,	  the	  examples	  here	  alert	  one	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  uncanny	  histories	  in	  many	  other	  places	  since	  historicism	   has	   nowhere	   managed	   to	   eradicate	   its	   alternatives.	   Unsettled	   pasts	   of	   violence	   and	  displacement	   and	   presents	   beset	   by	   ongoing	   tensions	   (political,	   economic,	   religious/ethnic)	   do	  contribute,	  however,	  to	  a	  particular	  vitality	  and	  saliency	  of	  uncanny	  histories	   in	  the	  post-­‐Ottoman	  sphere.	  
Keywords:	  Alevis,	  Freud,	  genres	  of	  history,	  Greek	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  history,	  the	  uncanny	  	   In	   this	  article	   I	  explore	   the	  poetics	  of	  history	   in	   the	  post-­‐Ottoman	  world	  by	  examining	  how	  people	  configure	  the	  connections	  between	  events	  past,	  present,	  and	  future.	  Mental	  maps	   of	   time	   exist	   everywhere	   (Zerubavel	   2003),	   and	   they	   do	   not	  come	   in	   discrete	   cultural	   packages	   as	   Eliade’s	   (1971)	   typology	   of	   archaic	   (static,	  circular),	   Christian	   (teleological),	   and	  modern	   (linear,	   random)	  might	   lead	   one	   to	  think.	   They	   are	   not	   singular	   within	   any	   given	   society,	   but	   multiple	   and	   often	   in	  competition.	  They	  may	  alternate	   as	  Leach	   (1961)	  observed	   in	  his	   classic	   essay	  on	  the	   symbolic	   representation	   of	   Western	   time,	   where	   anxiety	   about	   linearity	   is	  moderated	   by	   images	   of	   cyclicity	   on	   a	   regular	   basis;	   or	   one	   type	   of	   time	   may	  suppress	   another	   as	   in	   Bloch’s	   (1977)	   argument	   that	   rituals	   reproduce	   the	   ideo-­‐logical	   status	   quo	   of	   the	   past,	   thereby	   obscuring	   novel	   practical	   ideas	   arrived	   at	  through	  everyday	  activity.	  Even	  anthropology	  itself	  is	  not	  immune	  to	  conflicts	  	  over	   time	  models	   as	   evidenced	   by	   Robbins’s	   (2007)	   claim	   that	   a	   fascination	  with	  cultural	  continuity	  has	  prevented	  the	  study	  of	  discontinuity.	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   Usually,	  one	  particular	  conception	  of	  historical	  time	  predominates	  in	  a	  given	  society	   as	   the	   unmarked	   or	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	   assumption.	   For	   contemporary	  Western	   societies,	   this	   concept	   is	   linearity,	   which	   governs	   everyday	   rationality,	  science,	  and	  historiography	  (Burke	  2001),	  and	  it	  is	  conventionally	  recognized	  by	  the	  term	   ‘historicism’	   (e.g.,	   Chakrabarty	   2000:	   7).	   The	   historicist	   timeline	   emerged	  visually	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  in	  the	  diagrams	  of	  Priestley,	  who	  plotted	  the	  lives	  of	   great	   thinkers	   as	   lines	   running	   horizontally	   across	   the	   page	   (Rosenberg	   and	  Grafton	   2010:	   18f.).	   The	   ascendance	   of	   linearity	   cast	   alternative	   ideas	   into	   higher	  relief	  (as	  anomalies),	  an	  example	  being	  the	  time	  charts	  printed	  in	  Laurence	  Sterne’s	  
Tristram	  Shandy	  (published	  in	  nine	  volumes	  between	  1759	  and	  1767).	  In	  the	  sixth	  volume,	   Sterne	   presented	   diagrams	   of	   the	   story	   line	   in	   each	   of	   his	   preceding	   five	  books	   (fig.	   1).	   The	   loops	   and	   squiggles	   indicate	   digressive	   narrative	   leaps	   going	  backward	  and	  forward	  in	  time	  in	  what	  might	  be	  the	  earliest	  graphic	  representation	  of	   temporal	   topology.1	  These	   diagrams	   arose	   as	   a	   comic	   foil	   to	   linearity,	   yet	   they	  captured	   the	   non-­‐linear	   human	   engagement	   with	   time,	   which	   continued	   in	   the	  shadow	   of	   linearity.2	   This	   example	   opens	   the	   theme	   I	   intend	   to	   pursue	   below,	  namely,	  the	  affective,	  political,	  and	  existential	  attributes	  of	  topological	  time	  and	  its	  juxtaposition	  to	  linear	  time	  (Rosenberg	  and	  Grafton	  2010:	  244).	  	   The	  concept	  of	   ‘the	  uncanny’	  reflects	  a	  further	  stage	  in	  the	  naturalization	  of	  linear	  temporal	   thought	  and	  also	  the	  effects	  of	  parallel	  Enlightenment	  tenets,	  such	  as	  objectivity	  (the	  value	  of	  tangible	  evidence),	  the	  scientific	  method,	  and	  the	  ideal	  of	  dispassionate	   inquiry.	   According	   to	   the	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary,	   the	   term	  ‘uncanny’	   did	   not	   become	   common	   in	   its	   current	   meaning	   of	   “partaking	   of	   a	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supernatural	   character;	   mysterious,	   weird,	   uncomfortably	   strange	   or	   unfamiliar”	  until	  1850.	  It	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  residue	  formed	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  science	  at	   the	   expense	   of	   religion,	   a	   crepuscular	   category	   where	   eerie	   and	   unsettling	  phenomena	  gradually	  accumulated	  (García	  Marín	  2015;	  Royle	  2003:	  22).	  	  	   The	  transformation	  of	  Enlightenment	  reason	  into	  intuitive	  ontology	  has	  not,	  however,	  been	  unidirectional	  or	  complete.	  In	  Latour’s	  (1993)	  formulation,	  we	  have	  never	   been	  modern	   but	   rather	   continue	   to	   fluctuate	   between	   the	   expectations	   of	  post-­‐Enlightenment	  reason	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  experiences	  where	  these	  expectations	  are	  violated.	   ‘We’	  are	  ontologically	   ‘multimodal’	  (Harris	  and	  Robb	  2012:	  676)	  with	  respect	   to	   history,	   as	   are	   post-­‐Ottoman	   societies	   and	   every	   other	   society	   that	   has	  internally	  produced,	  or	  come	  into	  contact	  with,	  competing	  systems	  of	  thought.	  The	  “Uncanny	   History”	   of	   my	   title	   refers	   to	   cases	   of	   post-­‐Ottoman	   topological	  historicizing	  where	  the	  past	  is	  not	  in	  its	  expected	  place.	  This	  may	  evoke	  an	  affective	  response	   not	   through	   intellectual	   surprise	   alone,	   but,	   as	   Freud	   contended,	   on	  account	   of	   the	   shocking	   immediacy	   of	   the	   encounter	   with	   powerful	   ideas	   and	  emotions	  from	  the	  past.3	  	  	   The	   post-­‐Ottoman	   world	   has	   no	   monopoly	   on	   uncanny	   histories,	   yet	   the	  violent	   recent	   past	   of	   the	   region	   has	   contributed	   to	   making	   local	   histories	   a	  “perpetual	   calendar	   of	   human	   anxiety”	   (Kermode	   1967:	   11).	   Displacement,	  persecution,	   or	   subjugation	   have	   left	   pulsating	   communal	   complaints	  whose	   slow	  decay	  prompted	  Loizos	  (1999)	  to	  describe	  them	  as	  ‘Ottoman	  half-­‐lives’.	  On	  all	  sides,	  fantasies	   of	   restitution	   percolate	   in	   the	   imagination,	   stymied	   from	   realization	   not	  only	  by	  political	  realities	  but	  also	  by	  the	  sheer	  impossibility	  of	  recovering	  the	  past.	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Compensation	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   restitution;	   it	   unsatisfactorily	   converts	   prized	  objects	  into	  other	  terms.	  But	  the	  originals	  no	  longer	  exist,	  either	  in	  themselves	  or	  in	  their	  contextual	  moment.	  They	  are	  past	  and	  can	  be	  restored	  only	  in	  counterfactual	  	  
Figure	  1	  Laurence	  Sterne,	  The	  Life	  and	  Opinions	  of	  Tristram	  Shandy,	  Gentleman,	  vol.	  6,	  1762	  original.	  
	  	  Note:	  This	  image	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  at	  https://archive.org/details/lifeand	  opinions03stergoog.	  See	  also	  Rosenberg	  and	  Grafton	  (2010:	  20).132	  |	  Charles	  Stewart	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imaginings.	   Even	   should	   the	   original	   be	   recovered	   in	   a	   hypothetical	   act	   of	  restitution,	   the	   insult	   and	   pain	   of	   its	   having	   been	   taken	   in	   the	   first	   instance	   can	  never	   be	   undone.	   This	   restitutive	   imaginary	   suffuses	   the	   post-­‐Ottoman	   world,	  informing	  a	  present	  that,	  in	  various	  modes	  of	  consciousness,	  probes	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  past,	  readily	  entertains	  temporal	  topology,	  and	  produces	  uncanny	  histories.	  
Myth	  and	  History	  
	   For	  the	  most	  part,	  topological	  histories	  have	  been	  studied	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  ‘myth’	   as	   opposed	   to	  history.	  Topological	   histories	  do	  differ	  markedly	   from	   linear	  histories,	  which	   emphasize	   objective	   verification	  over	   affective	   assertion,	   yet	   they	  also	  share	  much	  in	  common.	  Interest	  has	  accordingly	  turned	  to	  the	  continuities	  and	  commonalities	  between	  what	  were	  formerly	  conceived	  as	  polar-­‐opposite	  categories.	  Mali	   (2003)	   examines	   the	   catalytic	   role	   of	   myth	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   modern	  historiography,	   and	   Samuel	   and	  Thompson	   (1990)	   consider	  how	  historical	   events	  can	  take	  on	  moral	  or	  gnomic	  significance,	  thereby	  becoming	  myths	  that	  people	  live	  by.	  Anthropological	  works	  such	  as	  Peter	  Gow’s	  (2001)	  An	  Amazonian	  Myth	  and	  Its	  
History	  show	  that	  myths	  respond	  to	  social	  change	  and	  attempt	  to	  comprehend	  it	  by	  creating	   new	   analogies	   between	   the	   present	   and	   the	   past,	   including	   myths	  from/about	  the	  past	  (ibid.:	  279).	   If	  representing	  and	  understanding	  the	  past	   is	  the	  goal	  of	  history,	  myth	  becomes	  very	  hard	  to	  distinguish	   from	  history	   in	  such	  cases.	  Myth	  is	  then	  a	  form	  of	  history.	  	   I	   adduce	   a	   contemporary	   example	   from	   the	   United	   States	   to	   open	   up	   the	  study	   of	   the	   features	   of	  myth	   and	   topological	   history	   and	   also	   as	   a	   reminder	   that	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these	  are	  not	  unusual	  forms	  found	  only	  in	  peripheral	  places	  such	  as	  Amazonia	  or	  the	  post-­‐Ottoman	  sphere.	  Jackie	  Robinson	  was	  the	  first	  African	  American	  major	  league	  baseball	  player.	  On	  15	  April	  1947,	  he	  broke	  through	  the	  color	  barrier	  to	  play	  for	  the	  Brooklyn	  Dodgers.	  Like	  other	  great	  players,	  he	  was	  voted	  into	  the	  National	  Baseball	  Hall	  of	  Fame.	  But	   in	  1997,	  25	  years	  after	  his	  death,	   things	   took	  an	  unprecedented	  direction	  when	  his	  number	  was	  retired	  for	  all	  of	  baseball.	  No	  one	  on	  any	  team	  can	  now	  wear	  the	  number	  42.	  Then,	  starting	  in	  2004,	  a	  Jackie	  Robinson	  Day	  (15	  April)	  was	  instituted	  during	  which	  all	  players	  on	  every	  team	  wear	  the	  number	  42,	  and	  in	  April	   2013,	   the	   film	  42	  was	   released	   to	   coincide	  with	   Jackie	  Robinson	  Day.	   Jackie	  Robinson’s	   life	  story	  has	  become	  a	  parable	  about	   the	  struggle	   for	  equality	  and	  the	  demise	   of	   racism—a	   story	   that	   America	   likes	   to	   tell	   itself,	   with	   more	   and	   more	  fanfare.	  	  	   Many	  outstanding	  baseball	  players	  played	  alongside	  or	  against	  Jackie	  Robin-­‐son,	  and	  there	  are	  even	  books	  and	  films	  about	  some	  of	  them.	  But	  for	  the	  most	  part	  they	   are	  past	   personages	  with	  no	  particular	   afterlife	   except	   in	   the	  minds	  of	   those	  interested	   in	  baseball	  history.	  They	  are	  the	  past	  past.	  The	  Jackie	  Robinson	  story	   is	  certainly	   history	   in	   that	   it	   has	   past	   factuality,	   but	   it	   operates	   now	  more	   as	  myth,	  buttressed	  by	  an	  annual	   ritual.	  The	  difference	  between	  history	  and	   this	  particular	  type	   of	   myth,	   which	   grows	   out	   of	   historical	   factuality,	   is	   that	   the	   emphasis	   has	  shifted	   from	  a	   focus	   on	   the	  past	   per	   se	   to	   a	   set	   of	   images	   and	   stories	   that	   inform	  understanding	   of	   life	   today,	   guiding	   morality	   in	   the	   present	   and	   into	   the	   future.	  Standard	  history	  operates	  as	  present	  thought	  about	  the	  past,	  while	  myth	  operates	  in	  a	  timeless	  present.	  I	  say	  ‘timeless’	  because	  these	  sorts	  of	  mythical	  formulations	  have	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a	   durability	   that	   is	   not	   subject	   to	   the	   normal	   decay	   of	   criticism	   and	   forgetting.	  Of	  course,	   people	   know	   that	   Jackie	   Robinson	   lived	   in	   the	   past,	   but	   the	   truth	   and	  meaning	   of	   that	   life	   now	   float	   free	   from	   pastness;	   indeed,	   it	   is	  made	   present	   and	  pointedly	   so	   for	   every	   player	   who	   wears	   42	   on	   15	   April.	   If	   new	   historical	  information	  should	  emerge,	  this	  will	  not	  necessarily	  affect	  the	  myth.	  The	  film	  shows	  Robinson	  breaking	  his	  bat	   in	  the	  tunnel	  after	  being	  abused	  by	  fans.	  When	  his	  wife	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  never	  happened,	  the	  film	  director	  responded	  that	  it	  well	  could	  have.4	   Such	   poetic	   license	   works	   in	   line	   with	   a	   coherence	   theory	   of	   truth	   that	  resonates	   with	   assumptions	   and	   feelings	   about	   the	   case	   at	   hand,	   not	   by	   a	  correspondence	   theory	   that	   requires	   external	   evidence	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   statements.	  Standard	   history	   can	   grow	   with	   new	   interpretations	   of	   existing	   facts,	   and	   it	  undoubtedly	   grows	   when	   new	   factual	   sources,	   such	   as	   a	   trove	   of	   letters	   or	   an	  archaeological	   discovery,	   come	   to	   light.	   Myth	   is	   always	   internally	   growing	   as	   the	  core	   message	   continually	   receives	   enhancement	   while	   remaining	   impervious	   to	  factual	  criticism.	  	  	   The	  everyday	  semantic	  difference	  between	  myth	  and	  history	  takes	  myths	  to	  be	  false	  in	  contrast	  to	  histories.	  In	  the	  view	  I	  am	  taking	  here,	  myths	  and	  histories	  can	  both	   be	   true	   and	   can	   overlap,	   but	   myths	   are	   true	   at	   a	   level	   different	   from	   the	  scientific	   methods	   of	   evidence	   and	   probability	   that	   underwrite	   historiography.	  History	  aims	  for	  the	  truth,	  whereas	  myth	  begins	  as	  truth.	  Yet	  a	  history	  can	  escalate	  into	   a	   myth,	   and	   a	   myth	   can	   contract	   back	   to	   history	   and	   be	   largely	   forgotten.	  Documentary	  evidence	  may	  not	  kill	  myths,	  but	  changing	  times	  do.	   Jackie	  Robinson	  will	   be	   less	   necessary	   when	   racism	   in	   America	   becomes	   less	   problematic.	   “All	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meaning	   is	  answerable	  to	  a	   lesser	  meaning,	  which	  gives	   it	   its	  highest	  meaning,”	  as	  Lévi-­‐Strauss	  (1966:	  255)	  put	  it.	  	  	   In	  their	  account	  of	  children	  during	  the	  Greek	  Civil	  War	  (fought	  between	  1946	  and	  1949),	  Danforth	  and	  Van	  Boeschoten	  (2012:	  37)	  expose	  the	  power	  of	  the	  term	  
paidomázoma.	  This	  word,	  which	  literally	  means	  the	  ‘gathering	  up	  of	  children’,	  refers	  to	  devshirme,	   the	  Ottoman	  practice	  of	  selecting	  Christian	  children	   from	  subjugated	  peoples	  throughout	  the	  empire	  and	  raising	  them	  to	  be	  loyal	  Muslim	  subjects	  known	  as	   Janissaries,	  who	   could	   rise	   to	   high	   public	   office.	   During	   the	   latter	   phase	   of	   the	  Greek	   Civil	   War,	   as	   fighting	   intensified	   in	   northern	   Greece,	   both	   the	   government	  army	  and	  the	  resistance	  forces	  evacuated	  children	  from	  war	  zones.	  The	  government	  placed	  children	  in	  care	  at	  various	  institutions	  in	  Greece,	  while	  the	  Communist	  Party	  evacuated	   children	   from	   its	   area	   of	   control	   into	   Eastern	   Bloc	   countries,	   such	   as	  Yugoslavia,	  Romania,	  and	  Hungary.	  Up	   to	   the	  present	  day,	   the	  government	  and	   its	  mainstream	   supporters	   refer	   to	   the	   Communist	   evacuation	   of	   children	   as	  
paidomázoma	   (rendered	   as	   ‘abduction’	   or	   ‘kidnapping’	   in	   English),	   while	   the	  government’s	  evacuation	  is	  labeled	  ‘child	  protection’	  (paidophylagma).	  This	  usage	  of	  
paidomázoma	   collapsed	   the	   Communist	   evacuation	   of	   the	   late	   1940s	   with	   an	  oppressive	  Ottoman	  practice,	  which	  had	  ceased	  by	  1700.	  People	  were	  reaching	  back	  for	  an	  analogy	  from	  a	  distant	  past—not	  an	  episode	  that	  anyone	  knew	  first-­‐hand,	  but	  one	   that	   had	   been	   passed	   on	   in	   collective	   memory,	   very	   likely	   through	   history	  textbooks,	   as	   a	   quintessentially	   evil	   action	   perpetrated	   by	   the	   archetypal	   enemy	  against	   a	   helpless	   Greek	   nation.	   This	   offers	   another	   example	   of	   history	   being	  amplified	   into	  a	  myth	   that	   can	  guide	  moral	  action	   in	   the	  present.	   It	   resembles	   the	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even	  older	  myth	  of	  the	  tribute	  of	  Athenian	  youths	  to	  King	  Minos	  of	  Crete	  to	  be	  fed	  to	  the	  Minotaur.	  	  	   The	   historical	   practice	   of	   devshirme	   contained	   negative	   moral	   potential	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  theme	  of	  kidnapping.	  It	  also	  involved	  conversion	  to	  Islam	  and	  service	  to	  the	  enemy,	  themes	  that	  came	  to	  guide	  interpretations	  of	  latter-­‐day	  events:	  the	  children	  taken	  to	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  during	  the	  civil	  war	  were	  being	  converted	  to	  communism	   and/or	   becoming	   de-­‐Hellenized	   and	   turned	   into	   Slavs.	   To	   this	   day,	  some	  of	  these	  children,	  now	  adults,	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  return	  to	  settle	  in	  Greece	  as	  they	  are	  not	  considered	  ethnic	  Greeks.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  mythicized	  image	  of	   the	   paidomázoma	   still	   animates	   government	   policies	   even	   though	   one	   of	   the	  ‘deeper	  meanings’	  supporting	  it—the	  Cold	  War—has	  disappeared.	  	   No	  matter	   how	  much	   evidence	   Danforth	   and	   Van	   Boeschoten	   (2012)	   pro-­‐duced	   to	  document	   the	  paidomázoma	  as	  a	  well-­‐intentioned	  evacuation	  program—and	   they	   give	   details	   of	   their	   public	   engagement—they	   could	   not	   dislodge	   the	  entrenched	   opinion	   that	   the	   evacuation	   was	   a	   nefarious	   abduction.	   The	  
paidomázoma	   shows	   how	   myths	   may	   be	   immune	   to	   historicization,	   while	   at	   the	  same	  time	  provoking	  more	  and	  more	  detailed	  historiography,	  such	  as	  Danforth	  and	  Van	  Boeschoten’s	  volume.	  	  	   The	  life	  cycle	  of	  the	  mythicized	  paidomázoma	  appeared	  to	  be	  winding	  down	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  military	  junta	  in	  1974	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  center-­‐left	  government,	  PASOK,	  which	  did	  much	  to	  defuse	  and	  move	  beyond	  the	  right-­‐left	  polarization	  that	  plagued	  Greece	   throughout	   the	   twentieth	   century.	  This,	   combined	  with	   the	  end	  of	  the	   Cold	   War	   mentioned	   above,	   would	   seem	   to	   have	   eradicated	   any	   ‘deeper	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meaning’	  holding	  the	  myth	   in	  place.	   Indeed,	  Greek	  children	  born	   in	   the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	   grew	   up	   unfamiliar	   with	   the	   term	   paidomázoma.	   However,	   with	   the	   new	  polarization	   in	   Greek	   politics	   brought	   on	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   extreme	   right-­‐wing	  Golden	  Dawn	  political	  party	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  the	  term	  has	  resurfaced	  and	  the	  younger	  generation	  are	  coming	  to	  comprehend	  it.	  The	  mythical	  past	  may	  come	  back,	   disappear,	   and	   then	   come	   back	   again,	   raising	   the	   question	   of	   whether	  powerful	  historical	  events	  such	  as	  wars	  are	  ever	  over.	  	   Other	   mythicizations	   have	   difficulty	   getting	   off	   the	   ground	   at	   all.	   Yannis	  Hamilakis	   (2012,	   2013)	   wonders	   how	   Zeus	   Xenios	   (hospitable	   Zeus/god	   of	  hospitality)	   could	   have	   been	   adopted	   as	   the	   official	   code	   name	   for	   the	   Greek	  government	   crackdown	   on	   illegal	   immigrants	   last	   year.	   Was	   this	   mistaken	  mythology?	   In	   an	   even	  more	  disturbing	  development,	   the	  Golden	  Dawn	  party	   has	  likened	   itself	   to	  ancient	  Spartans.	  At	  one	  of	   their	  rallies,	  a	  speaker	  compared	  their	  mission	  to	  the	  Spartan	  initiation	  rite	  called	  krypteia	  (hidden	  things)	  in	  which	  young	  Spartans	  murdered	  unsuspecting	  helots	   (a	   subjugated	   serf	   population)	   in	   stealthy	  attacks.	   This	   historical	   analogy	   possibly	   emboldens	   attacks	   on	   innocent	   migrants	  such	  as	  26-­‐year-­‐old	  Shehzad	  Luqman,	  a	  Pakistani	  who	  was	  knifed	  by	  motorcyclists.	  The	   assailants	   unscrewed	   and	  hid	   their	   number	  plates	   before	   speeding	   away	   in	   a	  modern-­‐day	   version	   of	   krypteia.	   Mythicization	   can	   be	   ill-­‐conceived	   or	   offer	   a	  template	  for	  criminal	  violence	  and	  still	  potentially	  recruit	  followers.	  	   Historians	  can	  never	  capture	  the	  past	  as	  it	  actually	  was;	  they	  can	  only	  aspire	  to	  that.	  They	  must	  be	  selective.	  And	  they	  can	  never	  eradicate	  presentism	  from	  their	  accounts,	  although	  they	  do	  recognize	  the	  danger	  of	  anachronism	  and	  work	  hard	  to	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avoid	  it.	  History	  is	  always	  history	  for	  a	  certain	  time	  and	  a	  specific	  audience.	  History	  is	  organized	  by	  temporal	  sequence;	  chronology	  is	  its	  deep	  structure,	  as	  Lévi-­‐Strauss	  (1966:	  258ff.)	  pointed	  out	  in	  The	  Savage	  Mind.	  Myth	  of	  the	  sort	  under	  consideration	  here—that	   is,	   the	   sort	   bordering	   on	   historiography—is	   structured	   by	   affect.	   The	  affective	   resonance	   of	   particular	   events	   brings	   them	   into	   relationship	   with	   other	  events	  in	  an	  allusive,	  analogical	  system.	  	  	   Daniel	  Knight	  (2012),	  for	  example,	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  biting	  realities	  of	  the	  current	  economic	  crisis	   in	  Greece	  have	  caused	   images	  of	   the	  World	  War	   II	   famine	  and	   the	   Greek	   Civil	   War	   to	   surface	   in	   contemporary	   Greek	   consciousness.	   These	  historical	  images	  amplify	  public	  apprehension	  that	  the	  sufferings	  of	  the	  past	  will	  be	  repeated	  in	  the	  future.	  They	  do	  so	  through	  analogical	  thinking	  in	  which,	  for	  example,	  the	  German	  occupation	  of	  Athens	  and	  the	  ensuing	  death	  by	  famine	  of	  some	  300,000	  people	  in	  the	  early	  1940s	  are	  paralleled	  with	  the	  current	  austerity	  imposed	  by	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank.	  Current	  German	  opposition	   to	   a	   lenient	  bailout	   is	  bitterly	  felt	   in	  Greece,	  and	  many	  political	  cartoons	  have	  cast	  Germany’s	  chancellor,	  Angela	  Merkel,	  as	  Hitler.	  German	  businesses	  have	  taken	  the	  lead	  in	  loaning	  Greek	  farmers	  the	  money	   to	   buy	  photovoltaic	   panels	   to	   lay	   over	   their	   fields	   in	   order	   to	   produce	  electricity	   rather	   than	   food	   (see	  Knight,	   this	   issue).	   Farmers	   in	   Thessaly,	   Greece’s	  breadbasket,	   complained	   about	   the	   disadvantageous	   long-­‐term	   contracts	   and	  accompanying	   loss	  of	   control	   over	   their	   land,	   comparing	   it	   to	   the	  Ottoman	  period	  when	   they	  were	   landless	   serfs	  working	   on	   large	   estates	   known	   as	   tsiflíkia	   (Turk.	  
ciftlik).	   As	   one	   man	   expressed	   it:	   “Greece	   has	   become	   the	   ciftlik	   of	   Europe”	   (see	  Knight	  2012:	  64).	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   The	  foreboding	  and	  fear	  that	  Ottoman	  times,	  Nazi	  occupation,	  and	  civil	  war	  incite	   by	   their	   eruption	   into	   the	   present	   is	   consistent	  with	   Freud’s	   ([1919]	   1955:	  219,	   240)	   definition	   of	   the	   uncanny	   as	   once	   familiar	   matter,	   encountered	   by	  surprise,	  and	  with	  unsettling	  effect.	  This	  historical	  uncanny	  is	  produced	  by	  temporal	  pollution	  (sensu	  Mary	  Douglas)—matter	  not	  in	  its	  correct	  temporal	  place.	  The	  year	  2013	   in	   Greece	   was	   not	   supposed	   to	   be	   another	   Ottoman	   period	   or	   a	   1942	   or	   a	  1948.	   Greek	   people	   have	   long	   found	   these	   painful	   pasts	   hard	   to	   contemplate	   and	  had	   consigned	   them	   to	   a	   twilight	   of	   partial	   memory.	   The	   malnutrition	   endured	  during	   famine	   not	   only	   left	   marks	   on	   the	   bodies	   of	   people,	   but	   also	   gave	   rise	   to	  numerous	   deep	   psychological	   reactions	   to	   food,	   such	   as	   parents	   inordinately	  concerned	  that	  their	  children	  eat.	  I	  always	  interpreted	  the	  refrain	  pháei,	  pháei	  (eat!	  eat!)	   as	   anxious	   hospitality,	   but	   it	   possibly	   stems	   from	   a	   basic	   worry	   about	   food	  itself.	   Currently,	   the	   affective	   resonances	   of	   the	   Greek	   present	   give	   this	   past	   new	  vitality.	   It	   is	   very	   different	   from	   the	   Jackie	   Robinson	   feel-­‐good	   story,	   which	   has	  undergone	  steady	  amplification.	  Robinson	  is	  a	  topologically	  bent	  story	  as	  well	  as	  a	  myth,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   uncanny	   because	   people	   want	   him	   and	   have	   never	   really	  forgotten	  him.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  stories	  told	  to	  Daniel	  Knight	  are	  feel-­‐bad	  stories,	  evil	  mythology,	   stories	   people	   do	   not	   like	   telling	   themselves	   about	   themselves,	   but	  which	  they	  cannot	  stop	  themselves	  from	  contemplating—and	  telling.	  
Autonomic	  History	  
	   Walter	  Benjamin	   (1968)	  offers	   a	  perspective	  on	   the	   sudden	  and	   surprising	  aspect	   of	   the	   uncanny	   apparition	   of	   the	   past.	   He	   conceptualizes	   the	   past	   as	   “an	  
	   13	  
image	  which	  flashes	  up”	  (ibid.:	  255)	  to	  consciousness	  in	  moments	  of	  danger,	  while	  Taussig	   (1984:	   88)	   describes	   it	   as	   “history	   [forming]	   analogies	   and	   structural	  correspondences	  with	   the	   hopes	   and	   tribulations	   of	   the	   present.”	   This	   imagery	   of	  the	   past	   comes	   into	   mind	   unexpectedly	   and	   “set[s]	   thinking	   in	   motion”	   (Adorno,	  cited	  in	  ibid.:	  89).	  	  	   Whereas	  in	  the	  contemporary	  Greek	  case	  documented	  by	  Knight	  (2012,	  this	  issue)	  the	  imagery	  of	  the	  past	  instigates	  fear,	  frugality,	  melancholy,	  or	  even	  suicide,	  Benjamin	   and	   Taussig	   see	   the	   analogical	   use	   of	   the	   past	   as	   empowering	   and	  redemptive.	   The	   past	   comes	   to	   hand	   as	   a	  weapon	   to	   be	   used	   in	   the	   fight	   against	  injustice,	  as	   if	   there	  existed	  “a	  secret	  agreement	  between	  past	  generations	  and	  the	  present	   one”	   (Benjamin	   1968:	   254).	   The	   spontaneous	   arrival	   of	   the	   past	  characterizes	   a	   particular	   moment	   of	   social	   potential,	   which	   Benjamin	   terms	   the	  
Jetztzeit,	   the	   now	   time,	   when	   the	   oppressed	   can	   slip	   the	   noose	   of	   traditional	  domination	  off	  their	  necks.	  The	  past	  dead	  become	  a	  source	  of	  power	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  moral	  sword	  in	  the	  present,	  not	  a	  premonition	  of	  suffering	  and	  doom.	  	   The	   past	   does	   not	   come	   into	  mind	   only	  when	   one	   intentionally	   decides	   to	  think	   about	   it.	   The	   past	   is	   in	   and	   around	   us	   all	   the	   time,	   cognitively	   distributed	  among	   persons,	   objects,	   and	   landscapes	   (Birth	   2012:	   12).	   Yael	   Navaro-­‐Yashin	  (2012)	   describes	   this	   as	   a	   situation	   where	   people	   and	   external	   objects	   are	   also	  affectively	   entangled.	   Affect	   circulates	   between	   them,	   prompting	   a	   post-­‐humanist	  analysis	  that	  does	  not	  posit	  the	  person	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  control	  (ibid.:	  41,	  133).	  Seeing	  a	  bullet	  hole,	  for	  example,	  or	  passing	  a	  grave	  or	  massacre	  site	  can	  provoke	  feelings.	  This	   is	   necessarily	   a	   diachronic	   relationship	   between	   the	   present	   moment	   and	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traces	  made	  in	  the	  past.	  Navaro-­‐Yashin	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Cyprus	  this	  past	  goes	  back	   to	   the	  1974	  Turkish	   invasions	  and	  partition	  of	   the	   island	  and	   therefore	  lies	  within	  living	  memory.	  	  	   By	  contrast,	  in	  Kóronos,	  a	  settlement	  in	  the	  mountains	  of	  the	  Greek	  island	  of	  Naxos,	  villagers	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  previously	  unknown	  past	  (Stewart	  2012).	  They	  dreamed	  of	  a	  buried	  icon	  calling	  out	  to	  be	  unearthed.	  This	  was	  an	  autonomic,	  surprising	   intervention	   of	   the	   past	   in	   the	   life	   of	   the	   community.	   The	   history	  produced	  in	  these	  dreams	  related	  to	  a	  distant	  past	  undocumented	  by	  any	  historical	  record.	   The	   dreams	   informed	   people	   that	   Egyptian	   Christians	   fleeing	   persecution	  over	  a	  thousand	  years	  earlier	  had	  deposited	  the	  icons.	  The	  dreamers	  vacillated	  over	  whether	   these	   Egyptians	  were	   fleeing	   Roman	   persecution	   in	   the	   third	   century	   or	  iconoclasts	   in	   the	   eighth	   century.	  Basically,	   objects	   representing	   a	   compression	  of	  past	  moments	   of	   persecution	  were	   coming	   to	   the	   surface	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   the	  villagers	  in	  a	  current	  moment	  of	  persecution.	  In	  the	  1830s,	  when	  these	  dreams	  first	  occurred,	  the	  Greek	  state	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  nationalizing	  the	  local	  emery	  mines,	  thereby	   impoverishing	   the	   people	   of	   Kóronos.	   In	   these	   dreams,	   as	   again	   in	   later	  dreams	  during	  the	  Great	  Depression	  in	  1930	  (Stewart	  2012:	  70),	  saints	  and	  material	  objects	  spoke	  to	  the	  villagers,	  and	  the	  villagers	  spoke	  back	  to	  them	  in	  their	  dreams.	  The	   historical	   (Egyptians)	   and	   the	   meta-­‐historical	   (saints	   and	   scenarios	   of	  redemption)	  combined	  to	  offer	  orientation	  in	  moments	  of	  crisis.	  The	  villagers	  at	  the	  time	   of	   the	   Greek	  War	   of	   Independence	   had	   not	   yet	   been	   exposed	   to	   historicism;	  they	  held	  a	  Romeic	  Christian	  temporal	  orientation,	  which	  assumed	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  past	  returning	  to	  redeem	  the	  present.	  The	  histories	  produced	  were	  topological	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but,	  in	  a	  Christian	  context,	  not	  necessarily	  uncanny	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘weird’,	  since	  such	  returns	   were	   hoped	   for.	   As	   Freud	   ([1919]	   1955:	   244)	   observed,	   the	   uncanny	  emerges	   according	   to	   rules	   of	   genre:	   “[O]ur	   own	   fairy	   stories	   are	   crammed	   with	  instantaneous	  wish-­‐fulfilments	  which	   produce	   no	   uncanny	   effect	  whatever.”	   After	  the	   installation	   of	   Otto,	   the	   Bavarian	   prince	  who	   became	   king	   of	   Greece	   in	   1832,	  however,	   Christian	   dreams	   caused	   friction	   with	   the	   emergent	   historicist	  suppositions	   of	   the	   state,	   which	   duly	   accused	   the	   Naxos	   dreamers	   of	   fraud.	   The	  Enlightenment	   had	   come	   later	   and	  more	   abruptly	   to	   Greece,	   and	   its	   oppositional	  attitude	  of	  suppression	  soon	  began	  to	  freight	  topological	  histories	  with	  ambivalence,	  thus	  tilting	  them	  toward	  the	  uncanny.	  	  
Post-­Ottoman	  Topological	  History	  
	   I	   earlier	   referred	   to	   Lévi-­‐Strauss’s	   (1966)	   view	   that	  myth	   is	   structured	   by	  affective	   resonance	   and	  history	   by	   chronology,	   but	   that	  was	  not	   his	   ultimate	   con-­‐clusion.	  He	  continued	  on	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  history	  is	  also	  constructed	  by	  affect	  and	   that	   this	   comes	  along	  with	   the	   idea	  of	  history	   as	  history	   for	  something	   (ibid.:	  257).	   National	   histories	   collect	   a	   series	   of	   emotional	   moments—wars,	   violations,	  victories,	   and	   celebrations	   are	   assembled	   on	   a	   timeline.	   The	   major	   historical	  periodizations	  are	  most	  often	  the	  epochs	  that	  follow	  wars	  or	  other	  disasters:	  the	  Pax	  Romana,	   the	   post–World	   War	   II	   period,	   or	   post-­‐Katrina	   New	   Orleans.	   Societies	  orientate	  themselves	  in	  relation	  to	  disruptive	  events	  and	  then	  reorientate	  after	  new	  cataclysmic	   events.	   The	   philosopher	   of	   history	   Frank	   Ankersmit	   (2002)	   contends	  that	   this	   is	   because	   traumatic	   events	   throw	  people	   into	   a	   direct	   relationship	  with	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reality,	   which	   reveals	   its	   radical	   strangeness.	   Trauma	   is	   thus	   the	   beginning	   of	  historical	  consciousness	  because	  it	  “is	  the	  sublime	  and	  vice	  versa	  and	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  both	  is	  an	  experience	  of	  reality	  that	  shatters	  to	  pieces	  all	  our	  certainties,	  beliefs,	  categories	  and	  expectations”	  (ibid.:	  75–76).	  I	  take	  Ankersmit’s	  use	  of	  ‘trauma’	  in	  the	  sense	   of	   emotionally	   overwhelming,	   rather	   than	   in	   the	   psychiatric	   PTSD	   sense.	  Historical	   consciousness	   establishes	   links,	   whether	   analogical	   or	   chronological,	  between	  these	  accumulating	  sublime	  experiences.	  	  	   Reactions	  to	  the	  burning	  of	   the	  Madımak	  Hotel	   in	  Sivas,	  a	  central	  Anatolian	  town,	  illustrate	  this	  last	  point.	  A	  mob	  set	  fire	  to	  the	  hotel	  in	  1993,	  killing	  37	  visitors	  who	   had	   been	   invited	   to	   attend	   a	   cultural	   festival.	   An	   Alevi	   association—Alevism	  being	   a	  minority	   branch	   of	   Islam	   in	   predominantly	   Sunni	   Turkey—had	   organized	  the	  festival.	  Most	  of	  those	  who	  perished	  were	  Alevis,	  and	  they	  are	  mourned	  by	  the	  Alevi	   community	   and	   viewed	   as	   martyrs.	   Their	   martyrdom	   has	   been	  commemorated	  over	  the	  years	  by	  public	  demonstrations	  in	  Sivas	  on	  the	  anniversary	  of	   the	   events,	   accompanied	   by	   demands	   for	   government	   accountability.	   These	  demonstrations	  have	  become	  very	   large	   gatherings	  of	  Alevis	   and	   their	   supporters	  from	  all	  over	  Turkey	  and	  Europe.	  The	  state	  approaches	  their	  day	  of	  commemoration	  with	  heavy	   security	  precautions	   in	   the	   form	  of	   barricades	   that	  prevent	   the	   crowd	  from	   coming	   close	   to	   the	   Madımak	   Hotel	   site,	   which	   supporters	   want	   to	   see	  converted	   into	   a	   memorial	   to	   the	   martyrs.	   Every	   year,	   then,	   police	   containment	  strategies	  cause	  those	  attending	  the	  demonstration	  to	  re-­‐experience	  sensorially	  the	  authority	   of	   the	   state	   in	   conditions	   approaching	   those	   of	   the	   original	   incident—a	  form	  of	  political	  historical	  re-­‐enactment.	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   There	   is	  a	  history	  of	  contestation	  and	  mutual	  suspicion	  between	  Alevis	  and	  state	   authorities	   in	   Turkey,	   and	   this	   context	   disposes	   the	   Alevi	   community	   to	  conceive	  of	   the	  “Sivas	  Massacre”	  as	   “one	   in	  a	   long	  chain	  of	  atrocities”	   (Çaylı	  2014:	  20),	  exhibiting	  an	  “ethnohistorical	  ideological	  conflation”	  (Mandel	  2008:	  255).	  This	  iterative	   relationship	   to	  martyrdom	   is	   evoked	   and	   inculcated	   in	   the	   central	   Alevi	  ritual	  known	  as	  cem,	  which	  involves	  emotive	  identification	  with	  the	  Twelve	  Imams,	  or	   martyrs,	   represented	   by	   candles	   that	   are	   extinguished	   at	   the	   climax	   of	   the	  ceremony	  (ibid.:	  280;	  see	  also	  Tambar	  2011).	  Past,	  present,	  and	  future	  atrocities	  are	  activated	   (or	   anticipated)	   and	   rolled	   into	   one	   timeless	   post-­‐Ottoman	   topological	  experience	  during	  the	  cem.	  	  	   The	  Sivas	  Massacre	  has	  been	  fitted	  into	  this	  structure	  of	  historical	  conscious-­‐ness	   and	   placed	   in	   strong	   relation	   to	   one	   particular	   preceding	   martyrdom:	   the	  execution	   of	   Pir	   Sultan	   Abdal,	   a	   sixteenth-­‐century	   minstrel	   who	   was	   accused	   of	  fomenting	  revolt	  against	  Ottoman	  authority.	  As	  Çaylı	  (2014:	  20)	  explains:	  
[Pir	  Sultan	  Abdal]	  is	  believed	  to	  have	  later	  been	  hanged	  in	  Sivas	  by	  the	  governor.	  The	   1993	   culture	   festival	   in	   Sivas,	   whose	   guests	  were	   targeted	   by	   the	   arsonist	  mob,	  was	  named	  after	  Pir	  Sultan,	  while	  also	  a	  state	  sponsored	  sculpture	  reputedly	  depicting	  him	  was	  erected	  in	  a	  public	  square	  in	  Sivas	  the	  night	  before	  the	  festival.	  On	   July	   2nd,	   prior	   to	   setting	   the	   hotel	   on	   fire,	   the	   arsonist	   mob	   defaced	   this	  monument	   and	   demanded	   its	   toppling	  …	   [In	   an	   attempt	   to	   reduce	   tension]	   the	  local	   municipal	   and	   state	   authorities	   decided	   to	   meet	   the	   mob’s	   request	   and	  brought	   them	   the	   toppled	  monument	   as	   proof.	   This	   is	   believed	   to	   have	   further	  encouraged	  the	  perpetrators.	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   The	  Sivas	  martyrs	  and	  the	  martyrdom	  of	  the	  sixteenth-­‐century	  Pir	  Sultan	  are	  thus	  intimately	  linked,	  and	  the	  Pir	  forms	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  martyrology	  extending	  back	  to	   the	   martyrdom	   of	   Husayn	   at	   Karbala	   in	   ad	   680.	   It	   is	   as	   if	   the	   martyrdom	   of	  Husayn	   in	   the	   past	   were	   like	   a	   huge	   star,	   with	   other	   events	   of	   lesser	   magnitude	  within	   its	   gravitational	   field.	   The	   Sivas	  Massacre	  will	   perhaps	   grow	   in	   size	   inside	  collective	  historical	  consciousness	  as	  time	  goes	  by	  and	  exert	  its	  own	  pull	  on	  future	  events.	  Experientially,	  all	  of	  these	  events	  can	  be	  felt	  as	  compacted	  into	  one	  present	  swirl:	  a	  “time-­‐knot,”	  to	  use	  Chakrabarty’s	  (2000:	  112)	  Bengali	  expression,	  a	  vortex,	  or	  even	  a	  black	  hole,	  to	  remain	  consistent	  with	  the	  galactic	   imagery.	  Each	  phase	  is	  co-­‐present,	  embedded	  into	  the	  others,	  giving	  a	  multi-­‐temporal	  emotional	  resonance	  to	  the	  present	  moment.	  	  
Uncanny	  History	  
	   As	  Karl	  Mannheim	  ([1924]	  1952:	  85–86)	  put	   it:	  “Historicism	  …	  is	  a	  Weltan-­
schauung	   [that]	   not	   only	   dominate[s]	   our	   inner	   reactions	   and	   our	   external	  responses,	  but	   also	  determine[s]	  our	   forms	  of	   thought.	  Thus,	   at	   the	  present	   stage,	  science	   and	   scientific	   methodology,	   logic,	   epistemology,	   and	   ontology	   are	   all	  moulded	  by	  the	  historicist	  approach.”	  The	  central	  idea	  of	  historicism	  is	  that	  time	  is	  divided	  into	  past,	  present,	  and	  future.	  The	  past	  is	  over	  with	  and	  knowable,	  and	  the	  future	  is	  yet	  to	  come	  and	  unknowable,	  although	  predictable	  to	  a	  certain	  degree.	  As	  time	  goes	  by,	  society	  builds	  on	  its	  past,	  and	  this	  past	  becomes	  recognizably	  past.	  The	  uncanny	  arises	  as	  a	  scandal	  to	  this	  certitude.	  Freud’s	  essay	  on	  the	  uncanny,	  written	  around	   the	   same	   time	   as	  Mannheim’s	   diagnosis	   of	   pervasive	   historicism,	   rests	   on	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the	   bedrock	   of	   this	   historicism.	   The	   uncanny	   surprises	   and	   shocks	   because	   it	  violates	  the	  intuitive	  temporal	  ontology	  of	  modernity.	  The	  uncanny	  arises	  as	  a	  stark	  identifiable	  figure	  against	  the	  background	  of	  historicism.	  	   Mannheim	   was	   not,	   however,	   entirely	   accurate.	   Historicism	   had	   become	  hierarchically	  dominant	  in	  his	  time,	  but	  other	  forms	  of	  relating	  to	  the	  past	  continued	  to	  exist	  in	  its	  shadow.	  Spiritism,	  for	  example,	  flourished	  in	  the	  1920s	  as	  a	  bereaved	  population	  attempted	  to	  communicate	  with	  those	  killed	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  In	  any	  case,	   human	   beings	   constantly	   produce	   other	   relationships	   to	   time.	   Temporal	  linearity	  may	   be	   an	   objective	   system	  of	  measurement,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   necessarily	  capture	  the	  quality	  of	   lived	  temporality.	  Phenomenologists	  beginning	  with	  Husserl	  have	  shown	  that	   temporal	  experience	  can	  be	   fused	   in	  a	  past-­‐present-­‐future	  where	  knowledge	   from	   the	   past	   collides	   with	   projections	   of	   the	   future	   in	   present	  perception	   and	   action	   (Gell	   1992:	   221).	  Heidegger	   expanded	   this	   in	   his	   particular	  existential	  ontology	  where	  Being	  is	  orientated	  to	  the	  future,	   the	  past,	  and	  then	  the	  present,	   often	   in	   that	   order,	   although	   in	   principle	   human	   beings	   experience	  temporality	   in	   any	   order.	   At	   different	   times	   people	   live	   profoundly	   toward	   the	  future,	  whether	  hopefully	  or	  anxiously,	  and	  at	  other	  times	  are	  burdened	  by	  the	  past	  or	  not	  able	  to	  supersede	  it.	  	   The	  view	  suggested	  by	  phenomenology	   is	   that	  experiencing	   the	  past	  or	   the	  future	   in	   the	   present	   is	   a	   perennial	   human	   trait,	   not	   an	   optional	   or	   easily	   sup-­‐pressible	   feature.	   Linearity	   has	   not	   obliterated	   other	   temporalities,	   but	   rather	   co-­‐exists	   with	   them	   unstably	   in	   the	   multi-­‐modal	   ontology	   referred	   to	   earlier.	   Paul	  Ricoeur	  (2004:	  393)	  takes	  up	  this	  point	  when	  reflecting	  on	  the	  challenge	  that	  school	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history	   poses	   for	   collective	   memory.5	   Personal,	   familial,	   and	   communal	   histories	  transmitted	  by	  known	  people	  in	  relation	  to	  familiar	  places	  and	  objects	  make	  sense.	  These	   local	  histories	  may,	   as	  exemplified	  by	   the	   cases	   considered	  above,	   resort	   to	  topological	   time	   structures	   and	   affective	   connections	   in	   order	   to	   impart	   their	  messages.	   School	   history	   textbooks	   come	   as	   ‘externalities’—not	   only	   written	   but	  also	   couched	   in	   hard-­‐to-­‐assimilate	   terms	   of	   chronology	   and	   names.	   Scholastic	  historiography	  can	  present	  the	  community	  with	  novel	   facts,	  but	  my	  point	   is	  that	   it	  challenges	  them	  with	  an	  odd	  way	  of	  knowing.6	  	  	   For	  Ricoeur	  (2004:	  394),	   learning	  from	  schoolbooks	  involves	  gradual	   famil-­‐iarization	  with	  “the	  uncanniness	  of	  the	  historical	  past.”	  At	  first,	  historicism	  is	   itself	  uncanny	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  disturbing	  or	  disquieting,	  even	  shocking,	  when	  introduced	  into	   non-­‐historicist	   settings.	   In	   time,	   however,	   people	   bring	   historicist	   structures	  into	   relation	  with	   local,	   perhaps	  more	   topological	   and	   affectively	   driven	   forms	   of	  historicizing,	   such	   as	   the	   dream	   apparitions	   of	   saints	   on	   Naxos	   or	   the	   emotive	  historical	  consciousness	  of	  martyrdom	  among	  Alevis	  in	  Turkey.	  Ultimately,	  uncanny	  histories	   are	  not	   just	   the	  product	  of	   a	  historicist	  measuring	   stick.	   It	   is	   the	   tension	  and	   instability	   between	   local	   non-­‐historicism	   and	   historicism	   (often	   purveyed	   by	  the	   state	   or	   other	   authorities)	   that	   continually	   produce	   experiences	   of	   uncanny	  histories	   (Bryant	   2014:	   682).	   Uncanny	   histories	   expose	   the	   incomplete	   synthesis	  between	  two	  different	  genres	  of	  history.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  unresolved	  grievances	  or	  disputes	  over	  facts	  keep	  uncanny	  histories	  vital	  as	  the	  necessary	  mode	  of	  grounding	  alternative	  pasts	  in	  the	  certitude	  of	  experience.	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Notes	  	  
1.	  As	  a	  branch	  of	  geometry,	  topology	  allows	  consideration	  of	  shapes	  that	  have	  been	  bent	   and	   not	   merely	   stretched,	   as	   in	   standard	   geometry.	   A	   plate	   and	   a	   bowl	  made	  out	  of	  wet	  clay	  can	  be	  shaped	  back	  and	  forth	  into	  one	  another	  without	  the	  need	   to	   break	   any	   lines,	   and	   they	   are	   therefore	   topological	   variations	   of	   one	  another.	  	  2.	  As	  Sterne	  (1760:	  163)	  put	  it:	  “Digressions,	  incontestably,	  are	  the	  sunshine;—they	  are	  the	  life,	  the	  soul	  of	  reading;—take	  them	  out	  of	  this	  book,	  for	  instance,—you	  might	   as	  well	   take	   the	  book	   along	  with	   them;—one	   cold	   eternal	  winter	  would	  reign	  in	  every	  page	  of	  it.”	  	  3.	  Freud	  ([1919]	  1955:	  223;	  italics	  in	  original)	  quoted	  Schelling	  to	  make	  this	  central	  point	   in	   his	   essay:	   “Unheimlich	   is	   the	   name	   for	   everything	   that	   ought	   to	   have	  
remained	  …	  secret	  and	  hidden	  but	  has	  come	  to	  light.”	  	  4.	  One	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  film	  commented:	  “At	  some	  point	  he	  had	  to	  break,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  Rachel	  Robinson	  didn’t	  fight	  us	  to	  take	  [the	  scene]	  out	  [of	  the	  film],	  to	  me	  proves	  that	  it	  is	  true.”	  See:	  http://www.historyvshollywood.com/reelfaces/42-­‐movie-­‐jackie-­‐robinson.php	  (accessed	  5	  January	  2014).	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5.	   Bryant’s	   (2014)	   study	   of	   property	   in	   occupied	   territory	   after	   the	   partition	   of	  Cyprus	   applies	   Ricoeur’s	   ideas	   and	   comes	   to	   conclusions	   about	   the	  ‘unhomeliness’	  of	  history	  that	  inform	  my	  discussion.	  	  6.	   This	   parallels	   the	   reaction	   to	   the	   imposition	   of	   dogmatic	   theology	   on	   local	  religion.	  In	  reaction	  to	  reformist	  imams	  pronouncing	  on	  proper	  practice,	  a	  local	  Bosniak	   Muslim	   objected	   to	   “the	   dead	   tradition	   contained	   in	   books”	   (Henig	  2012:	  761).	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